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Abstract Contact tracing apps were considered among the
first tools to control the spread of COVID-19 and ease
lockdown measures. While these apps can be very effective
at stopping transmission and saving lives, the level of
adoption remains significantly below the expected critical
mass. The public debate as well as academic research about
contact tracing apps emphasizes general concerns about
privacy (and the associated risks) but often disregards the
value-added services, as well as benefits, that can result
from a larger user base. To address this gap, the study
analyzes goal-congruent features as drivers for user adoption. It uses market research techniques – specifically,
conjoint analysis – to study individual and group preferences and gain insights into the prescriptive design. While
the results confirm the privacy-preserving design of most
European contact tracing apps, they emphasize the role of
value-added services in addressing heterogeneous user
segments to drive user adoption. The findings thereby are
of relevance for designing effective contact tracing apps,
but also inform the user-oriented design of apps for health
and crisis management that rely on sharing sensitive
information.
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1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has created a state of emergency
in countries around the world. In the early phase of the
pandemic, governments considered contact tracing apps as
one of the most promising tools to fight the virus and
prevent lockdown measures. Corona-Warn-App in Germany, SwissCovid in Switzerland, and TousAntiCovid in
France are just a few of the national apps that were
developed and launched in 2020. Despite the high expectations, the adoption rates in most countries remained far
below the threshold of 60% which corresponds to the
desired percentage of a country’s population using contact
tracing apps for them to be effective (University of Oxford
2020). In Europe, France with 47% (Rodgers 2021), UK
with 40% (NHS 2021), and Germany with 39% (RKI 2021)
boast the ‘‘best in class’’ adoption rates in 2021, although
they still fail to meet expectations in terms of critical mass.
In many countries in the West, the introduction of
contact tracing apps has been accompanied by controversial debates about their privacy implications and the risk of
surveillance and revealed ethical or moral dilemmas (Rowe
2020). Accordingly, earlier research on contact tracing
apps has mostly focused on the technology design for
privacy-preserving apps (Ahmed et al. 2020; Cho et al.
2020; Yasaka et al. 2020). Because of the slow adoption
rates, von Wyl et al. (2020) called for more research on the
acceptability of contact tracing apps to provide an understanding of the rationale behind their use. Some of the first
empirical studies that responded to this call are Trang et al.
(2020), who analyze the impact of various app
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specifications (i.e., benefit appeal, privacy design, and
convenience design) on app acceptance, as well as Meier
et al. (2021) and Welrave et al. (2020), who examine users’
intentions to use contact tracing apps in light of privacy
concerns. Other studies have analyzed how more users can
adopt contact tracing apps. For example, Buder et al.
(2020) apply choice experiments to assess users’ preferences for additional benefits, such as priority testing and
food delivery, for increased uptake. Similarly, Jonker et al.
(2020) assess the role of financial incentives on users’
adoption of contact tracing apps. Although these studies
highlight that offering extended services can lead to a
larger user base, their core focus remains on privacy
design, which is reflected in the current app designs
worldwide. Increasing adoption of contact tracing apps has
proved to be a challenge, and involving users in the discussion on app characteristics and aspects related to the
data processing is critical to ensuring mass acceptance
(Redmiles 2020). This was also highlighted by Gupta and
De Gasperis (2020), who suggest participatory design with
users to help ensure that contact tracing apps meet their
needs and are usable. While Trang et al. (2020) suggest
there should be a one-size-fits-all app, their results also
show that users’ preferences are far from uniform. In IS
research, the privacy calculus explains the intention to use
as the result of privacy trade-offs between expected benefits and perceived privacy risks (Dinev and Hart 2006).
Thus, we anticipate an opportunity to address the varying
preferences of different segments of the population with
more targeted features that would provide both public and
individual benefits. Wortmann et al. (2019) suggest that
goal-congruent features, which are additional features on
top of the core system functionality, can result in higher
system use, regardless of its core features. For contact
tracing apps, this implies that more attention is needed to
provide services that offer benefits to users and can result
in a larger user base.
This motivates our research goal to explore the role of
goal-congruent features in improving the design of contact
tracing apps and as an adoption driver. More specifically,
we study the following question:
What are users’ preferences for contact tracing app
features, and what is the impact of value-added services on users’ adoption of these apps?
Based on a conjoint analysis (CA) study in Germany, we
provide empirical insights into users’ preferences for core
and privacy-preserving features, as well as value-added
services of contact tracing apps. As an established market
research technique, CA is a ‘‘practical set of methods for
predicting consumer preferences for multi-attribute options
in a wide variety of product and service contexts’’ (Green
and Srinivasan 1978, p. 103). Occasionally, it has been
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used to study privacy trade-offs in the design of personal
ICTs (Mihale-Wilson et al. 2017; Naous and Legner 2019).
Our results confirm the dominant privacy-preserving
design of most national contact tracing apps in Europe but
also contribute to a more nuanced understanding of individual and group preferences. Following market simulations, we find that goal-congruent features – specifically,
value-added services with a clear benefit structure – play an
important role in driving user adoption.
From our study, we gain insights for a prescriptive
design that allow the formation of app features that fit
users’ expectations, with implications for service providers
to adjust their offerings to different user segments. Our
contributions are two-fold: first, our findings emphasize the
role of goal-congruent features in addressing heterogeneous user segments with different benefit-risk tradeoffs
and thereby fostering mass adoption. Second, methodologically we demonstrate that conjoint analysis – specifically, market simulation techniques – allow us to explore
user preferences as a complementary method for participatory app design. Thus, our study contributes to the design
efforts of contact tracing apps in particular, but more
generally inform the user-oriented design of apps for digital health and crisis management that rely on sharing
sensitive information.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: First, we
provide background on contact tracing in the context of
COVID-19. Then, we introduce the applied research
methodology, followed by a detailed description of the
design of the CA. Next, we present the empirical results.
Finally, we discuss our findings and conclude with implications for research and practice.

2 Background
2.1 Contact Tracing and Disease Control
Contact tracing is a key control measure in the battle
against infectious diseases and, when systematically
applied, can break the chain of transmission (Feretti et al.
2020). The World Health Organization (WHO) defines
contact tracing as ‘‘the process of identifying, assessing,
and managing people who have been exposed to a disease
to prevent onward transmission’’ (WHO 2018, p. 2).
Contact tracing is an extreme form of locally targeted
control and can be highly effective when dealing with a
low number of cases(Eames and Keeling 2003). It has
traditionally been carried out by health authorities using
expert-led interview-based techniques, which requires
availability of human resources and subject to recall bias
where not all contacts might be identified (O’Connell et al.
2021). In the case of COVID-19, contact tracing requires
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identifying people who may have been exposed to the virus
and following up with them every day for at least 14 days
from the last exposure (Legendre et al. 2020). Because
symptom onset may only occur days after infection, it is
difficult for traditional approaches to map the network of
potential exposure traces and, thus, control the transmission rate of the virus. Therefore, advanced techniques are
required for effective contact tracing in the COVID-19
context.
2.2 Contact Tracing Apps for COVID-19
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, governments and health
authorities around the world developed mobile applications
that enable digital contact tracing as a fast and reliable way
to support the public health authorities’ traditional
approaches. These contact tracing apps continuously track
users’ proximity and, in the event of possible COVID-19
exposure, notify them that they should self-isolate (Feretti
et al. 2020; Legendre et al. 2020). Simulations confirm that
if approximately 60% of the population uses the national
contact tracing app, it is possible to stop the epidemic and
keep countries out of lockdown (University of Oxford
2020). In reality, however, adoption rates remain significantly below this threshold in almost all countries (see
Table 1).
Among the first countries to develop and launch a
contact tracing app was Singapore with TraceTogether. To
date, more than 4.8 million users (i.e., around 90% of the
population) have registered on the app or are using the
physical tracking tokens equipped with Bluetooth, which
were introduced because of the slow uptake of the app at
the outset (tracetogether.gov.sg). Based on the same
framework, Australia’s COVID Safe app reached a user
base of around 7 million, which represents over a quarter of
the country’s population, but has been shelved because of
performance barriers and technical flaws (SkyNews Australia 2021). Italy, which was one the countries most
affected by COVID-19, launched the Immuni app in June,
but its adoption rate remains at 16% (Nepori 2021).
Switzerland introduced the SwissCovid app in June 2020
and had over 1.6 million users after one year but continues
to lag behind its active user goal of 3 million for the app to
be effective (FOPH 2021). France launched StopCOVID
during the same period but had to release a new version of
the app (TousAntiCovid) at the end of October 2020 to
overcome adoption barriers. This version has an adoption
rate of 47% and owes its success to the added features that
include a digital COVID certificate for vaccination. Similarly, Germany’s Corona-Warn-App was launched in June
2020 and has reached over 32 million users (over 39% of
the population) after integrating new features (RKI 2021).
One of the late arrivals was the UK’s NHS COVID-19 app,
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which was launched in September 2020 and has an adoption rate of 40% – thanks, in large part, to the additional
features integrated into the app (NHS 2021).
2.3 Design of Contact Tracing Apps for COVID-19
The design of national contact tracing apps has been subject to lively debate in most European countries that mostly
focused on their privacy implications and the technology
design for privacy-preserving apps (Ahmed et al. 2020;
Cho et al. 2020; Yasaka et al. 2020). Common tracing
mechanisms rely on a smartphone’s absolute location (in
the case of location-based tracing) or relative location to
other smartphones (in the case of proximity-based tracing)
(Legendre et al. 2020). Proximity-based contact tracing
relies on Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) to infer the relative
proximity of smartphones (up to 50 m outdoors and 25 m
indoors), while location-based contact tracing uses GPS for
precise location. Whereas most countries use BLE technology in the design of their contact tracing apps, only a
few have adopted a location-tracking mechanism to crosscheck paths, as Israeli app Hamagen has done.
The type of architecture adopted for the alerting mechanism in these apps (i.e., centralized versus decentralized)
has significant privacy implications (Ahmed et al. 2020).
While both approaches require a central server to exchange
users’ pseudo IDs, the main difference is the matching of
traces with positive user IDs. With the centralized
approach, IDs are shared with the central server managed
by the public health authorities to match with positive cases
and notifications. Doing so allows authorities to have a
controlled environment in which to fight the pandemic
since the alerting is carried out by the central server in the
case of a match. With a decentralized approach, the
matching is done on the user’s smartphone with the list of
infected IDs. Both approaches communicate anonymously;
however, the decentralized approach is regarded as more
privacy-preserving since no logging data is exchanged with
the server from the user’s smartphone, except in the case of
infection (Legendre et al. 2020). While Singapore and
Australia follow centralized approaches, the only Western
European country to do so is France with the TousAntiCOVID app (originally launched as StopCOVID), which is
built based on the ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing protocol (ROBERT). It is worth noting that
apps with a centralized architecture might require preregistration with personal information (e.g., TraceTogether
and COVIDSafe) for verification by the central server;
however, apps relying on the ROBERT protocol do not
require such information (Ahmed et al. 2020).
The core functionality of apps is tracing and alerting
users. In addition, these apps can provide features for
fighting the pandemic and applying safety measures. For
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Table 1 Overview of contact tracing apps (as of September 2021)
App (by
country)

Launch date

Users*
(Sept.
2020)

Users*
(Sept.
2021)

Approach

Technology

User
identification

Value-added
services

20 March 2020

?2M
(42%)

? 4.8 M
(90%)

Centralized

Based on legacy BLE

Phone number
required

SafeEntry
integration
Physical tokens

22 March 2020

? 1.5 M
(17%)

? 2.5 M
(27%)

Decentralized

Cross-referencing of GPS
data

No information
required

Safe places

25 March 2020

? 0.7 M
(8%)

? 1.3 M
(14%)

Decentralized

Based on legacy BLE

Phone number
required

Symptoms
check

26 April 2020

?7M
(28%)

?7M
(28%)

Centralized

Based on legacy BLE

Personal
information
required

Information
center/
Statistics

1 June 2020

?4M
(14%)

? 10 M
(16%)

Decentralized

Apple-Google Exposure
Notification

Region required

Digital COVID
certificate

2 June (launched
as StopCOVID)

? 2.3 M
(3%)

? 32 M
(47%)

Centralized

ROBERT (centralized
based on legacy BLE)

No information
required

Information
center
QR-code
scanning
(check-in)
Digital COVID
certificate

16 June 2020

? 17.8 M
(21%)

? 32.4 M
(39%)

Decentralized

Apple-Google Exposure
Notification

No information
required

25 June 2020

? 1.5 M
(17%)

? 1.65 M
(19%)

Decentralized

DP-3 T and AppleGoogle Exposure
Notification

No information
required

Risk
assessment
Contact diary
QR-code
scanning
(check-in)
Digital COVID
certificate
QR-code
scanning
(check-in)

24 September
2020

–

? 26.8 M
(40%)

Decentralized

Apple-Google Exposure
Notification

Region required

TraceTogether
(Singapore)

Hamagen
(Israel)

StoppCorona
(Austria)

COVIDSafe
(Australia)

Immuni (Italy)

TousAntiCovid
(France)

Corona-WarnApp (Germany)

SwissCovid
(Switzerland)

NHS COVID19 (UK)

*Percentage of users is calculated with respect to the total inhabitants of the country
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Symptoms
check
QR-code
scanning
(check-in)
Test booking
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instance, logged data on encounters and information provided on the app can be used to estimate possible infection
risk; this is the case for the Corona-Warn-App, which has a
risk assessment feature. Other apps provide notifications
about safe places and infected zones or contextual services
such as check-in services for safe entry (e.g., TraceTogether). With the emergence of vaccines, the digital
COVID certificates have been added to Corona-Warn-App
and TousAntiCovid. From Table 1, we find evidence that
the continuous development and introduction of further
features beyond proximity tracking and notifications
increased user engagement and adoption since the contact
tracing apps’ first launch.

application architecture and data sharing (Horvath et al.
2020; Zhang et al. 2020). Buder et al. (2020) and Wiertz
et al. (2020) employ conjoint analysis to determine the
optimal app configuration for an increased adoption rate to
above 60% in Germany and the UK, respectively. Their
studies demonstrate the role of additional benefits (e.g.,
priority testing) in improving adoption, in addition to the
secure and privacy-aware design. Moreover, Frimpong and
Helleringer (2020) and Jonker et al. (2020) find that
financial incentives can motivate further downloads of the
app and boost its adoption. However, all of these studies
limit their scope on app design in terms of privacy-related
features.

2.4 User Perspective on Contact Tracing Apps

2.5 Research Gap

User adoption is a crucial factor for the success of contact
tracing apps in curbing the transmission of COVID-19. The
public debate led by experts and politicians has mostly
focused on privacy concerns as barriers to adoption (Cho
et al. 2020). Walrave et al. (2020) highlight the ethical and
legal concerns that users have about digital contact tracing
and call for a transparent relationship with users and clear
processing of their information. Two perspectives prevail
in the existing research (Table 2): The first perspective
investigates users’ intentions to use contact tracing apps in
terms of motivations and barriers (Altmann et al. 2020; Li
et al. 2020; Meier et al. 2021; Walrave et al. 2020), and the
second applies conjoint analysis to study user preferences
for the privacy-aware design of these apps (Degeling et al.
2020; Zhang et al. 2020; Buder et al. 2020; Jonker et al.
2020).
When it comes to intentions to use, the results of these
studies emphasize the alleviated user concerns about their
data privacy and sharing their information with the application owner, whether a private institute or government. A
great portion of the discussion has revolved around the
application’s architecture, which favors a decentralized
approach and type of data shared (e.g., the use of location
data) (Li et al. 2020). In addition, Simko et al. (2020)
emphasize the role of trust in the government for overcoming privacy concerns associated with contact tracing
apps through transparency and clear communication about
data management processes within the app. Trang et al.
(2020) highlight the need for a clear understanding of the
benefit structure to provide insights on the most valuable
features that can drive user adoption.
Studies relating to contact tracing app design employ
discrete choice experiments in assessing users’ preferences
and trade-offs for different implementation options.
Alternatively, Behne et al. (2021) employ prototype testing
to study enhanced contact tracing apps. The core focus of
the conjoint studies is on privacy features related to

Given the slow adoption rates and the criticality of contact
tracing apps in this pandemic, but also in the future, there is
a pressing need for empirical studies to investigate whether
individuals are willing to use these apps and under what
circumstances (van Wyl 2020). Prior research strongly
focuses on privacy-aware design and the incentives to use
these apps (see Table 2) but has missed studying the different facets of actual app designs, including the wider set
of services that support users. With the exception of Behne
et al. (2021) and O’Connell et al. (2021), we are lacking
studies that discuss the learnings from the existing app
designs and produce design knowledge that helps improve
them to achieve higher user acceptance. From prior IS
research and the privacy calculus, we infer that privacyaware design (covering the risks or costs) should be studied
in the context of core and value-added services (offering
benefits to users). In addition, we have seen from previous
studies that perceived benefits for both self and society,
privacy perceptions, and usability aspects can play an
important role in the adoption of contact tracing apps (e.g.,
Trang et al. 2020). In view of the diverging user perceptions, we conclude that analyzing individual and group
preferences for different app designs and their privacy
trade-offs could provide important insights for prescriptive
design (Bélanger and Crossler 2011). From general
research on mobile app design, we know that goal-congruent feature additions to core services exert a positive
influence on app adoption (Wortmann et al. 2019). Applied
to contact tracing apps, the role of value-added services is
an area worth exploring to maximize app adoption and,
thus, lead to effective countermeasures against COVID-19
and its variants.
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Table 2 User perspective on contact tracing apps
Authors

Sample

Method

Focus

Findings

Altmann
et al. (2020)

Survey

Intention to use

Cybersecurity and privacy concerns, as well as lack of
trust in the government, are barriers to adoption

Hassandoust
et al. (2021)

Multiple countries
(n = 5995)
US
(n = 853)

Survey

Intention to use

Li et al.
(2020)

US
(n = 1963)

Survey

Intention to use

Simko et al.
(2020)

Multiple countries
(n = 2337)

Survey

Intention to use

Walrave
et al. (2020)

Belgium
(n = 730)

Survey

Intention to use

Meier et al.
(2021)

Germany
(n = 952)

Survey

Intention to use

Trang et al.
(2020)

Germany
(n = 518)

Survey

Intention to use

Degeling
et al. (2020)

Australia
(n = 793/n = 1215)
(before/after
outbreak onset)

CA-Choice
experiment

App design: Privacy
features

Horvath
et al. (2020)

CA-Choice
experiment

App design: privacy
features

Zhang et al.
(2020)

UK
(n = 1504 and
n = 809)
US
(n = 2000)

Intention to use affected by risk beliefs, perceived
individual and societal benefits to public health,
privacy concerns, privacy protection initiatives, and
technology features
Trust in public health authorities affects intention to
use
Perception of the public health benefits and others’
willingness to adopt has a larger impact on adoption
than perceptions of the app’s security and privacy risks
Privacy concerns about data sharing, usage, and
developer identity limit users’ intention to use
Informed consent and transparency can mitigate
privacy concerns
Technical and legal concepts play an important role in
users’ intention to use
Perceived benefits of the app, followed by self-efficacy
and perceived barriers, have an impact on adoption rate
Cues to action are positively associated with the users’
intention to use
Perceived benefits of the app are more important than
privacy concerns
Trust can mitigate privacy concerns and increase
perceived benefits
Citizens with different propensities for acceptance:
critics, undecided, advocates
In addition to privacy and convenience, multilayered
benefit structure is an important factor for mass
acceptance
Relative importance of seven attributes: respect for
personal autonomy; privacy; data certainty; data
security; infectious disease mortality prevention;
infectious disease morbidity prevention; and attribution
of (causal) responsibility
Impact of multiple attributes related to privacy and data
security on users’ decision

CA-Choice
experiment

App design: privacy
features

Buder et al.
(2020)

Germany
(n = 1472)

CA-Choice
experiment

App design: Privacy
features and
additional benefits

Wiertz et al.
(2020)

UK
(n = 2061)

CA-Choice
experiment

App design: Privacy
features and
additional benefits

Frimpong
and
Helleringer
(2020)
Jonker et al.
(2020)

US
(n = 394)

CA-Choice
experiment

App design: Privacy
features and financial
incentives

Attitudes toward six attributes of the hypothetical app:
app developer, app name, data storage architecture,
expiration conditions, minimum percentage of US
smartphone users for effectiveness, and technology use
Preferences for the different configurations and
importance of attributes with privacy considerations
and technology implementation, monitoring, and
additional benefits
Preferences for the different configurations and
importance of attributes with privacy considerations
and technology implementation, monitoring, and
additional benefits
Importance of financial incentives in the decisionmaking process about app use compared with privacy
and accuracy

Netherlands
(n = 900)

CA-Choice
experiment

App design:
Additional benefits
and financial
incentives

Relative importance of different attributes related to
the type of warnings, testing, control over the
communication of test results, and financial incentive
for app adoption
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Table 2 continued
Authors

Sample

Method

Focus

Findings

Behne et al.
(2021)

Germany
(n = 1993) (n = 53)

Survey (to evaluate
existing features)
Prototype testing

App design:
Additional benefits

Evaluation of enhanced tracing app containing 13
potential front-end (i.e., information on the regional
infection situation, education and health literacy, crowd
and event notification) and six potential back-end
functional requirements (i.e., ongoing modification of
risk score calculation, indoor versus outdoor)

3 Research Approach and Design
Our study builds on the idea of goal-congruent feature
additions as drivers for the adoption of contact tracing
apps. It aims to understand individual and group user
preferences for different app designs and analyze the
impact of value-added services on the adoption of contact
tracing apps to improve their design.
We employ CA, which seeks to provide evidence of the
factors that most influence the consumer’s choice of a
product. Applying the utility concept from economics, CA
enables the estimation of a user preference structure based
on his evaluation of different product attributes or features.
For these reasons, CA is gaining popularity to study
information privacy trade-offs in different types of services
(Krasnova et al. 2009; Ho et al. 2010) and is a very suitable method to inform IS design through an empirical
analysis of user preferences.
In applying CA, we follow the methodological guidelines for IS studies outlined by Naous and Legner
(2017, 2021) and use ACBCA, which extends the traditional full-profile CA (Green and Srinivasan 1978). This
CA variant combines the advantages of adaptive- and
choice-based procedures (Johnson et al. 2003). It is based
on a choice experiment where participants have to choose
from among a set of profiles (corresponding to different
product combinations) after they perform a self-explicated
task to assess must-have and unacceptable attribute levels
from the evaluation to reduce the choice burden. Based on
users’ choices, part-worth utilities and relative importance
measures are calculated using the hierarchical Bayes (HB)
estimation (Howell 2009).
3.1 Attributes and Levels Selection
The first (and often challenging) step in CA is to identify
the attributes that are relevant to forming users’ preferences. In selecting the attributes and levels, we followed a
mixed-method approach (Naous and Legner 2017) based
on four stages.

In the first stage, we reviewed recent articles that compare the different contact tracing apps (Legendre et al.
2020; Ahmed et al. 2020) and assess the user’s perspective
(Trang et al. 2020; Gupta and De Gasperis 2020) in order to
identify the attributes describing the core functionalities
and privacy-related characteristics. This resulted in 12
attributes corresponding to four dimensions representing
the main contact tracing app features: initiation, core
functionalities, transparency and control, and platform
characteristics. In the second phase, we examined nine
contact tracing apps (cf. Table 1) to understand the realization options in actual contact tracing apps and identify
the attribute levels. Based on this analysis, we decided to
add two attributes to our list characterized as value-added
services that can provide additional benefits and attract
more users: diagnosis and contextual services.
In the third phase of the attributes and levels selection,
we organized a focus group with five current and potential
users of COVID-19 apps to identify important attributes
and eliminate the unacceptable option. This phase also
allowed us to add one attribute that we did not consider in
our initial list. For the app to provide a risk assessment,
additional health information might be required for accurate estimations. Therefore, we consider health information
registration as an option for the initiation dimension.
Finally, we assess the list of attributes and levels with
two privacy experts, who are also familiar with the different contact tracing apps and validated the attributes and
the levels. Based on these phases, our final list comprised
10 attributes with corresponding levels (Table 3):
The Initiation dimension specifies attributes related to
registering on the app. We excluded attributes for registration options that are present in all apps and focus only on
one attribute:
•

Health information registration: specifies whether data
about health status (e.g., COVID-19 risk groups) is
required on the app or not for a more robust data
analysis and ideally risk assessment.

Core Functionalities comprises three basic features
offered by all existing COVID-19 apps:
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Table 3 List of attributes and levels
Dimension

Attribute

Initiation

Health information registration

Attribute levels
No information is required
Health status (i.e., COVID-19 risk groups information)

Core functionalities

Exposure logging

Contacts (Bluetooth)
Locations (GPS traces)
Contacts & locations

Test results sharing

User can share symptoms or positive test results on app
User can share positive test results on app only with a validation code
obtained from the healthcare provider
Healthcare provider directly shares test results (positive/ negative)
with users

Exposure notification

Alert only if you had contact with an infected person
Alert if you had contact with an infected person; includes risk
assessment (low, medium, high)

Value-added services

Diagnosis services

No in-app diagnosis
Simple diagnosis: symptoms tracking with a checklist
Advanced diagnosis: using sensors to capture symptoms (e.g.,
breathing, coughing)

Contextual services

No additional services
Check-in service with QR code in public places for safe entry (e.g.,
restaurants, supermarkets)
Maps that indicate safe areas/infected zones

Transparency and control

Dashboard

Basic dashboard on data logging
Detailed dashboard on data logging, updates, and sharing

Data sharing

Restricted to contact tracing (sharing with app provider – in other
words, only public health authorities)
Contact tracing, epidemiological insights, and research (sharing with
public health authorities, healthcare providers, and researchers)
Contact tracing, research, and specific purposes for safety measures
(e.g., restaurants, transportation providers, workplace)

Platform Characteristics

Architecture

Centralized
Decentralized

Interoperability

•

•

•

Exposure logging corresponds to the tracing mechanism employed on the app. It could be proximity
tracing with Bluetooth technology, location tracking
via GPS traces, or a combination of both.
Test results sharing indicates how the exposure notification is triggered on the app. It could be via user
sharing of symptoms or test results. Sharing of test
results could be by the user and validated by the
healthcare provider, or directly by the healthcare
provider (i.e., also includes clearing status in case of
a negative test result).
Exposure notification refers to how users get notifications in case of an encounter with an infected person. It
could give an alert only in case of exposure; users can
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Cross-country integration
No cross-country integration

also get a risk assessment based on logged data,
information on the country region, health status, and
other background information.
Value-added services comprise features that provide
additional benefits to users.
•

•

Diagnosis services can be used to check COVID-19
symptoms. They can be either through basic health
checklists on possible symptoms or advanced diagnosis
with machine learning on mobile sensor data (i.e., heart
rate, breathing, coughing strength, etc.) (CORDIS
2020).
Contextual services correspond to additional services
related to safety measures; examples are check-in
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services for safe entry in public places based on
customer count or identification of safe places and
infected zones through interactive maps.
Transparency & Control comprises features for transparent data management on the app.
•

•

Dashboard corresponds to transparency about the data
usage on the app. It could be a basic dashboard on
status and data logs or more detailed with sharing
information on data logging, contact traces, and sharing
parties.
Data sharing purpose refers to the target of the data
sharing and with whom it will be shared. It can be
restricted to contact tracing (sharing with app provider
– in other words, only public health authorities),
involves epidemiological insights and research (sharing
with public health authorities, healthcare providers, and
researchers), or includes sharing for additional safety
measures (e.g., check-in at restaurants, public transports, or workplaces).

concrete realization instead of verbal descriptions (Naous
and Legner 2017).
Participants had to complete the four ACBCA sections
in the following order:
1.

2.

3.

Platform characteristics relates to the app’s technical
design and communication between the app and the remote
server.
•

•

App architecture corresponds to the alerting mechanism, which can be implemented in a centralized or
decentralized approach (Ahmed et al. 2020). In a
centralized architecture, users share their IDs with a
central server, and matching with positive cases is done
on the server. In a decentralized approach, only an
infected person is required to share data with the server
and all matching with positive cases is done on the
user’s smartphone, which periodically receives a list of
infected IDs from the server.
Interoperability corresponds to the cross-country integration options. It could be a national app that can only
be used in a specific country or allows safe information
exchange with other apps to be used when traveling.

3.2 Study Setup
To run our study, we used Sawtooth Software, which is a
specialized software with advanced modules for CA survey
administration and data analysis. The online survey started
with an introduction to contact tracing apps and the conjoint survey sections. We then explained the attributes
involved and the different levels (or options) before collecting user choices in the typical ACBCA sections. When
possible, we added screenshots of the app to illustrate the
differences between levels. This was done for two attributes: exposure notification and dashboard (Fig. 1). Visuals would make it easier for the users to select based on

605

4.

Build Your Own (BYO). Participants are asked to build
the most preferred configurations of the contact tracing
app from the list of available attributes and levels. This
provides input on individual preferences. Subsequent
sections are then adapted to the preferred levels
selected by the participants.
Screening. The survey contained seven screening tasks
with three options, where participants assess the
possibility of using different app designs. As part of
the self-explicated task, this section helps to better
understand the user’s non-compensatory behavior.
Respondents are asked about must-have and unacceptable features based on their response pattern. To avoid
bias in selection, these identified features will not be
displayed later.
Choice Task Tournament. Based on their answers to
previous questions, ‘‘respondents are evaluating concepts that are close to their preferences in the build
your own section specified product, that they consider
‘possibilities’, and that strictly conform to any cut off
(must have/unacceptable) rules’’ (SawtoothSoftware
2014). We present a maximum of 10 choice tasks to
respondents with three options. This allows us to
estimate the user preferences for the different attributes
and levels based on the choice data.
Calibration. While traditional CBCA includes a
‘‘None’’ option, this is not available in ACBCA.
Instead, a ‘‘None’’ threshold can be estimated via the
Screening and Calibration section. To calibrate utilities, participants are shown six concepts, including the
concept identified in the BYO section, the concept
winning the Choice Tournament, as well as four
previously shown concepts that were either accepted or
rejected. The participant is asked about their likelihood
to use these concepts using a five-point scale from
‘‘Definitely would not’’ to ‘‘Definitely would

The last phase of the survey included questions on
demographics (gender, age) and professional background,
as well as questions on general mobile app use and opinion
about the COVID-19 app.
3.3 Study Sample
To obtain qualified results, we targeted 300 participants
from Germany, the country with the highest number of
absolute contact tracing app users (see Table 1), who are
users or potential users of the national contact tracing app
(Corona-Warn-App). Our choice of this mixture of users
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(a) Exposure notification

(b) Dashboard

Fig. 1 Mobile screenshots for attributes levels

and non-users is justified by our research objective, which
targets prescriptive design for improved adoption. Our
study was conducted in June 2020 shortly after the CoronaWarn-App was launched and users had already become
more familiar with its features. Uptake during this initial
post-launch period was substantial but flattened in the
following months. This allows us to understand opportunities for improvement in the contact tracing app design
based on feedback from users. As for non-users, their input
is important to build insights on desired app design for
potential use.
We selected Prolific.co as a crowdsourcing platform to
hire survey participants from an online pool of users.
Crowdsourcing platforms, such as Prolific and MTurk,
provide a fast, inexpensive, and convenient sampling
method and are appropriate for generalizing studies (Jia
et al. 2017). They have been widely used in research on
security and privacy (Redmiles et al. 2019) and allow a
wide reach in CA studies (Pu and Grossklags 2015; Naous
and Legner 2019). To guarantee that respondents’ participation was completely anonymous and all data collected
would be treated confidentially and not disclosed in its
original form, the study setup was examined by the relevant Ethics Committee. Participants were screened based
on their smartphone use and knowledge about the COVID19 app. Survey respondents were compensated £2.50 for
their participation, which is a fair amount for a survey
between 15 and 20 min on this platform. As quality criteria, we eliminated 17 responses that took less than 7 min
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for survey completion, which might affect the consistency
of the analysis.
Of the total remaining 283 respondents that we included
in the final data analysis (Table 4), 55.83% were male and
44.17% were female. Most of the respondents (50.18%)
were aged between 26 and 35 years, with 94% younger
than 46 years. We assessed their previous privacy experience (based on Xu et al. (2009)) by questioning whether
they have frequently heard about the misuse of user
information in the media. Based on their responses, the
sample can generally be characterized as privacy-aware
(82.33%) and reflects the general attitude in Germany,
where the population is concerned about misuse of personal information and exposure to social interactions. In
terms of mobile app use, our sample is tech-savvy and uses
plenty of apps, among them navigation (95.41%), social
networking (79.86%), and health and fitness (54.77%).
Finally, we note that 62.54% of the respondents think the
COVID-19 contact tracing app should be mandatory.

4 Results
4.1 Relative Importance
CA provides relative importance scores based on partworth utilities for each attribute (Fig. 2). Our results show
the contact tracing app’s core services – exposure logging
(19%) and test results sharing (13%) – as the two most
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Table 4 Sample demographics
and background information
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Variable

Level

%

Gender

Male

55.83

Age

Female

44.17

18–25

31.10

26–35

50.18

36–45

12.72

46–55

3.53

56–65

2.12

66–75
Privacy Awareness (based on Xu et al. (2009))

important attributes. The app architecture (12%) comes
next, which reflects the general debate about centralized
and decentralized architectures. Diagnosis services had
11%, as a value-added service; interoperability (i.e., crosscountry integration) and contextual services had a similar
importance of 10%. Data sharing and health information
registration follow with an importance score of 8%, despite
these two attributes being related to user privacy on the app
and the associated risks. Although it is a core service,
exposure notification (5%) was less important to users who
are not interested in the method or form of notification.
Interestingly, transparency on the app was least important
with a score of 4%, which contradicts other studies on
privacy concerns and transparency in data management
(Ahmed et al. 2020).
4.2 Part-worth Utilities and Preferences
Part-worth utilities are normalized HB estimates that provide insight into users’ preferences for the different attributes and levels. Positive utilities correspond to preferred
levels, and negative utilities correspond to undesired levels.
We assess the ‘‘goodness of fit’’ using percentage certainty

0.35

Not informed

17.67

Well informed

82.33

(PC) and root likelihood (RLH) (Giessmann and Stanoevska 2012). We obtained a PC mean of 0.486, indicating acceptable results of fit. RLH valued 0.654, which is
considered more fit than the chance level given we have
three choice tasks.
The part-worth utility distribution (Table 5) allows us to
identify attribute levels that are mostly selected by users
through the choice options and, thus, correspond to their
preference structure and trade-offs regarding the app’s
overall design. Interestingly, we observe that users prefer
to provide information about their health status on the app,
most likely because this information would help generate a
more targeted analysis of their COVID-19 status. In terms
of exposure logging, contact tracing via Bluetooth (i.e., the
most privacy-preserving option) had the highest utility,
while GPS tracking had a negative utility and a combination of both has positive utility. For test results sharing,
users have positive utilities for trusted and officially validated test results sharing. However, the highest utility was
for sharing by the user via a validated code from the
healthcare provider. For exposure notification, users
appreciate having a risk assessment in addition to the
notification.

Fig. 2 Relative importance of
contact tracing app attributes

123

608

D. Naous et al.: Learning From the Past to Improve the Future, Bus Inf Syst Eng 64(5):597–614 (2022)

Table 5 User preferences and part-worth utilities (preferred levels are highlighted in bold)
Attribute

Attribute levels

Health information registration

No information is required

Average utilities
- 2.86

Health status
Exposure logging

Diagnosis services

2.86

51.16

56.54

113.56

46.64

Location

- 50.00

83.95

15.90

8.54

62.07

37.46

- 51.42

58.06

12.37

32.69
18.72

42.74
51.74

48.06
39.58
40.28

Symptoms or positive test results

Contact with an infected person

- 7.01

30.56

With risk assessment

7.01

30.56

59.72

No in-app diagnosis

5.74

53.54

34.63

Simple diagnosis
Advanced diagnosis
Contextual services

App architecture
Interoperability

47.35
18.02

- 4.52

51.02

37.10

- 8.67

52.58

29.33

Basic dashboard
Restricted to contact tracing

13.19

32.43

33.57

- 9.30

18.76

37.81

9.30

18.76

62.19

11.12

41.96

39.93

Includes epidemiological insights and research

3.39

26.85

24.38

Includes specific purposes for safety measures

- 14.51

46.59

35.69

Centralized
Decentralized

- 37.37
37.37

69.83
69.83

37.10
62.90

No cross-country integration

- 45.09

44.76

14.13

45.09

44.76

85.87

Cross-country integration

In terms of value-added services, the highest utilities
were for simple diagnosis services. Although advanced
diagnosis options with mobile sensors can be of great help
in detecting patterns and assessing the severity of symptoms, users seem to have concerns about extensive data
collection via the app. For contextual services, users prefer
the second option, which uses maps to identify infected
zones. However, when assessed individually in the BYO
section, users stated that they would not prefer an additional contextual service with the app. For transparency and
control, higher utilities were recorded for the detailed
dashboard and restricted data sharing, which are more
privacy-preserving options. For the choice of platform,
users have positive utilities for the decentralized approach
as a more privacy-preserving approach. Finally, the users
prefer cross-country integration. Therefore, our results
support the European Union (EU) member states’ effort to
establish a technical framework for cross-country contact
tracing for travelers and cross-border employees (Lomas
2020).

123

31.15
57.32

Check-in service with QR code

Detailed dashboard
Data sharing

25.83
- 31.57

No additional services
Maps of safe areas/infected zones

Dashboard

43.46

41.46

Positive test results with validation code
Healthcare provider shares test results
Exposure notification

51.16

Distribution for
BYO section (%)

Contacts
Contacts and location

Test results sharing

Standard
deviation

4.3 User Segmentation
While most research efforts aim for a one-app-fits-all
solution, our study reveals various user opinions that need
to be taken into account. To gain insights into different user
segments for contact tracing apps and varied group preferences, we performed a cluster analysis based on the
individual part-worth utilities. Using Sawtooth Software,
we employed the Convergent Cluster & Ensemble Analysis
module to find optimal groups of users based on their
varied preferences. By applying k-means clustering, we
were able to derive three clusters of users with varying
preferences concerning privacy-preserving features and
value-added services (Table 6). The final choice of clusters
was based on the highest reproducibility measure, which
represents the consistency of the given solution regarding
various starting points of the k-means clustering (Orme
2008). While the first two clusters (with a majority of users
combined) are concerned about privacy and prefer basic
features to guarantee user privacy, the third cluster is

D. Naous et al.: Learning From the Past to Improve the Future, Bus Inf Syst Eng 64(5):597–614 (2022)

unconcerned and would prefer design options that provide
an enhanced app experience.
The first two clusters are similar in terms of their preferences for privacy-preserving features when it comes to
the core functionalities, including contact tracing via
Bluetooth and sharing only validated test results to avoid
false alerts. However, for exposure notifications, the second group prefers having a risk assessment in addition to
the notification. The main difference is in the value-added
services, where the first segment (26.85%) does not prefer
any value-added service, while the second segment
(32.51%) prefers at least a simple diagnosis service for
tracking COVID-19 symptoms, as well as a contextual
service that provides information about infected zones and
safe places. For all other features, both segments share the
same preferences: They do not prefer to share any health
information on the app but do prefer a detailed dashboard
and no data sharing with parties other than the public health
authorities. They also prefer a decentralized approach but
with cross-country integration.
The third cluster, with more than 40% of the participants, prefers enhanced features on all attributes. There are
major differences with the previous segments in health
information registration, exposure logging, and diagnosis
services, where this segment prefers a combination of
contact and location tracking, as well as advanced diagnostic services. This segment also has inherent trust in the
authorities and would choose all available app features,
even if they are privacy-intrusive. This is shown in their
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choice of test results sharing by the authorities and the
centralized approach. In addition, data sharing for this
segment can help fight the pandemic in different contexts.
4.4 Variation Analysis
With market simulations enabled by conjoint analysis, we
can understand whether adding value-added services with
the proposed contact tracing app can result in higher
market shares and, therefore, better adoption rates.
Specifically, variation analysis allows us to study the effect
of changing attributes on market share predictions by
comparing utilities for different designs with respect to a
reference app. Thus, it provides a market simulation based
on reliable quantitative data that can feed the design of the
app and identify features that would improve the adoption.
As a reference app, we use the characteristics of the
German Corona-Warn-App. We then propose five variations (Table 7) corresponding to the multiple combinations
of value-added services within the app. App 1 has a simple
diagnosis service for checking symptoms via checklists.
App 2 has an advanced diagnosis service based on data
processing of sensor data (e.g., heart rate, breathing,
coughing, etc.) and applying machine learning algorithms.
App 3 has a safe entry check-in service with a QR code that
can be used in public spaces to track the number of people
inside a place and the positive check-ins. App 4 has a map
function with indications of safe places and infected zones
within a region. The final app (App 5) combines two value-

Table 6 Identified clusters with preferences based on customer segmentation
Cluster 1

Cluster 2

Cluster 3

Number of participants

76 (26.85%)

92 (32.51%)

115 (40.64%)

Privacy characterization

Privacy-concerned users

Privacy-concerned users

Unconcerned users

Value-added services

No additional services

Included

Included

Health information
registration

Not required

Not required

Health status

Exposure logging

Contacts

Contacts

Contacts and location

Test results sharing

Positive test results with validation
code

Positive test results with validation
code

Healthcare provider shares test
results

Exposure notification

Contact with an infected person

With risk assessment

With risk assessment

Diagnosis services

No in-app diagnosis

Simple diagnosis

Advanced diagnosis

Contextual services

No additional services

Maps of safe areas/infected zones

Maps of safe areas/infected zones

Preferences

Dashboard

Detailed dashboard

Detailed dashboard

Detailed dashboard

Data sharing

Restricted to contact tracing

Restricted to contact tracing

Specific purposes for safety
measures

App architecture

Decentralized

Decentralized

Centralized

Interoperability

Cross-country integration

Cross-country integration

Cross-country integration
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Table 7 Scenarios for variation analysis simulatio
Label

Reference

App 1

App 2

App 3

App 4

App 5

Description

Coronawarn-app

Simple diagnosis

Advanced Diagnosis

Check-in service

Maps

Simple
diagnosis ? maps

Health
information
registration

No information is required

Exposure
logging

Contacts (via bluetooth)

Test results
sharing

User can share positive test results on app only with a validation code obtained from the healthcare provider

Exposure
notification

Alert if you had contact with an infected person with risk assessment

Dashboard

Basic dashboard on data logging

Data sharing

Restricted to contact tracing

App
architecture

Decentralized

Interoperability

No cross-country integration

Diagnosis
services

No in-app
diagnosis

Simple diagnosis:
symptoms tracking
with checklists

Advanced diagnosis:
using sensors to
capture symptoms

No in-app diagnosis

No in-app
diagnosis

Simple diagnosis:
symptoms tracking
with checklists

Contextual
services

No
additional
services

No additional
services

No additional
services

Check-in service with
QR code in public
places for safe entry

Maps with
indication of safe
areas/infected
zones

Maps with
indication of safe
areas/infected zones

41%

28%

35%

40%

43%

Market share

added services that are selected with the highest utilities:
simple diagnosis and map function.
Based on the simulation results, we find that all the apps
generate market shares. This means their utility is higher
than the None threshold,1 and people would be willing to
adopt such apps. The calculations of the market shares are
adjusted to the smartphone user population in Germany to
reflect realistic measures of the total population. The difference in market shares compared with the reference app
(i.e., Corona-Warn-App) vary in strength. We observe that
App 1 (simple diagnosis) and App 4 (Maps) would result in
higher market shares within their categories for valueadded services, with slightly better results for App 1.
Consequently, App 5 with a diagnosis service of symptoms
tracking and contextual service of maps also resulted in
higher market shares: 43% of users.

1

With the ACBCA, a None parameter can be estimated in market
simulations to predict whether the respondents would select a
proposed option or not. On that basis, if the utility of the product
concept proposed is higher than the None utility, it will be chosen.
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5 Discussion: The Varying Users’ Preferences
for Contact Tracing Apps
The results from our conjoint analysis provide a micro
perspective (i.e., that of the user) of users’ preferences for
contact tracing apps through an evaluation of feasible
design options. In contrast to prior research, our study goes
beyond privacy-preserving aspects and the predominant
black-box view of contact tracing apps. It provides a system evaluation by using a comprehensive set of features
that include core and value-added services, as well as
platform characteristics and user control (privacy-preserving features). Our approach helps improve app design and
complements existing studies focused on user perception
(see Table 2), thanks to the fine-grained assessment that
highlights which of the features are required or most valued
by users. By delivering data-driven insights that may serve
as input for the participatory design of contact tracing apps
(Gupta and De Gasperis 2020), our findings contribute to
Pillar III of Von Wyl et al. (2020) regarding digital tracing
apps.
With regard to individual user preferences, we find that
exposure logging and test results sharing are the most
important features in contact tracing apps, while exposure
notification as the third core service lags far behind. Our
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findings support the dominant privacy-preserving design of
most European contact tracing apps and confirm user
preferences for a decentralized approach and contact tracing through proximity rather than location-based tracking
via GPS. Despite the ongoing debate about privacy concerns and contact tracing apps, the results show that not all
privacy-preserving features are valued by users. Previous
research in IS has emphasized the negative impact of users’
privacy concerns on system use (Xu et al. 2009; Krasnova
et al. 2010). Acquisti and Grossklags (2004) explain that
users’ attitudes can be contradictory and result in a privacy
paradox phenomenon. In this phenomenon, according to
Barth and de Jong (2017), users are willing to compromise
their privacy based on their assessment of the cost–benefit
trade-offs. Accordingly, our results provide empirical evidence of privacy trade-offs with regard to contact tracing
apps, in which users focus on the benefits associated with
the app during a critical worldwide pandemic rather than
the privacy risks or costs they entail. An alternative interpretation is that users trust these apps because they
implement privacy through design principles and are
implemented by authorities who protect the privacy rights
of citizens through the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Yang et al. 2020).
Our study also provides interesting insights into the
behavior of heterogeneous respondent groups with
diverging preferences, represented by the user segments
identified. Unlike Trang et al. (2020), we realize that no
one app fits all and that different specifications of tracing
apps contribute to their mass acceptance. While we observe
a trend in favor of privacy-preserving features and basic
functionalities (in the first and second segments), the largest user segment deems value-added services more
important than privacy-enhancing features. The market
simulation and variation analysis illustrate that contact
tracing apps achieve higher market shares if value-added
services are added beyond the basic app for tracing
encounters. This is in line with research by Wortmann et al.
(2019), who show that adding goal-congruent features to a
core system may result in a higher rate of adoption. For
contact tracing apps, the goal-congruent design implies a
paradigm shift from a strong focus on privacy-aware design
to explore value-added services that complement the app
(e.g., through diagnosis and contextual services). Our
results are in line with empirical evidence and current
developments of the national contact tracing apps (see
Table 1), where those countries that have integrated valueadded services within the apps show an increase in the
adoption rates. For instance, the TousAntiCOVID and the
Corona-Warn-App have received several updates over time
that included goal-congruent features such as a check-in
service and vaccination certificate, which led to a greater
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user base. Hence, value-added services could become a
game-changer in the adoption challenge.
To take privacy preferences into account, a viable
implementation option is to integrate auxiliary apps with
the COVID-19 app if needed. This is what Singapore did
by merging the national TraceTogether app with the
SafeEntry app as part of its safety measures to. The move
led to an increase in the adoption rate (Lee 2020). A
platform design could help avoid that several applications
functioning in silos emerge, with none of them achieving
critical mass: For example, Switzerland was the first
country to promote a decentralized approach that preserves
user privacy, but its app design did not have goal-congruent
features until 2021, when it added an event check-in
option. Individual apps are widely used in Switzerland,
such as SocialPass (similar to the Luca app in Germany)
for check-ins at restaurants and shops and a COVID Certificate app for vaccination. Applying a strategy similar to
the one in Germany by including all these different features
into the SwissCOVID app as a single platform can help
increase user adoption to ensure broader protection while
satisfying heterogeneous user needs.

6 Contribution
In conclusion, our study contributes to the design efforts of
contact tracing apps in particular and to design research in
general. First, we contribute theoretically through emphasizing the role of goal-congruent features in addressing
heterogeneous user groups and thereby fostering adoption.
Building on the work of Wortmann et al. (2019), we argue
that contact tracing app system design can be improved
through the integration of value-added services that benefit
the self as well as the public. Our results provide an
illustrative example of the impact of goal-congruent features on system use and acceptability and help explain the
uptake of contact tracing apps in Germany, France and UK.
Second, we contribute methodologically by demonstrating
the use of CA in exploring preferences with large,
heterogeneous user groups and providing insights into
trade-offs between core and privacy-preserving features as
well as value-added services. Thereby, CA supports the
participatory design and can complement existing methods
through its different techniques. Specifically, market simulations bring insights into the feature selection and design
process of these apps.
From a practical perspective, our results are relevant to
the application developers and service providers of contact
tracing apps. The preference model resulting from the CA
study provides concrete realization options of the contact
tracing app to be taken into consideration to gain sufficient
critical mass and acceptability among users. Our findings

123

612

D. Naous et al.: Learning From the Past to Improve the Future, Bus Inf Syst Eng 64(5):597–614 (2022)

support the development strategies of contact tracing apps,
which have extended their services in the meantime with
additional benefits (e.g., the German Corona-Warn-App
has an integrated check-in function). To support their
participatory design (Gupta and De Gasperis 2020), we
provide a data-driven approach that allows capturing user
preferences and including different stakeholders in the
discussion of the most convenient design options. This
approach is relevant for contact tracing apps, but can also
inform the future design of mobile apps for health and
crisis management that rely on sharing sensitive information (Behne et al. 2021).

7 Limitations and Outlook on Future Research
Contact tracing apps have a national scope and, thus, may
be impacted by both national implementation and contextual factors. As a result, an important limitation of our
study is its focus on a sample from Germany, which has
specific cultural characteristics and a democratic system, as
well as an a priori model of decentralized contact tracing. It
would be interesting to look at comparative studies in other
countries that have different government regulations and
app providers or have introduced centralized proximity or
location-based tracking apps to assess the different design
options. A cross-country perspective can provide additional
insights into user trade-offs, which are governed by contextual and situational circumstances in their country.
Since privacy is a dominant topic in contact tracing
apps, we have to acknowledge that our study focused on
understanding user preferences for app design, but we did
not use a detailed questionnaire to assess our respondents’
privacy awareness or concerns. Nonetheless, the results of
the ACBCA clearly showed the intention to use valueadding instead of privacy-preserving features, which
reflects the users’ a priori preferences and experiences.
Finally, it is important to note that our study took place
while the contact tracing apps were being launched, and
our selection of attributes was based on available and
suggested options in June 2020. This implies that our CA
study did not cover features that were created especially for
testing and vaccination. However, the suggested methodological approach could be used to study those additional
goal-congruent features in order to further improve the
design of contact tracing apps and expand the use of market
simulations in application design.
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